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INTRODUCTION
Developing information, communications and entertainment
technologies have helped discrete markets to converge.1
Previously stand alone markets for content and the conduit used to
transmit content also have become fully integrated into a single
medium thereby challenging the assumptions contained in
“legacy” regulations and laws,2 including the treatment of
1

“Over the last two decades, the communications industry has undergone rapid
technological advancements leading to the convergence of services. New technological
capabilities allow companies to compete in markets which previously had no
competition. While potentially beneficial to the consumer, convergence within the
communications industry has created a regulatory nightmare.” Ryan K. Mullady,
Regulatory Disparity: The Constitutional Implications of Communications Regulations
That Prevent Competitive Neutrality, 2 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2007). For
background on the impact of converging telecommunications and information processing
technologies see, for example, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, ITU
INTERNET REPORT 2006: DIGITAL.LIFE (Dec. 2006), http://www.itu.int/digitalife.
2
Telecommunications regulation in the United States operates on a medium specific
basis with separate rules and policies applicable to broadcasting, cable television,
telecommunications services and information services. See Rob Frieden, The FCC’s
Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications Affect Competition, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1275 (2004) [hereinafter Frieden, The FCC’s Name Game]; Rob Frieden,
Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison
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intellectual property.3 For example, the World Wide Web4
seamlessly blends the telecommunications links needed to transmit
information bits and packets5 with the content carried over these
links. However, separate laws and regulations apply to operators
of neutral networks providing telecommunications services that
deliver digital bits versus networks that actively combine
telecommunications6 with the bits that represent information7 and
of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207 (2003)
[hereinafter Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical].
3
With the exception of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1201–05 (1998), the most currently applicable intellectual property laws enacted by
the United States Congress occurred prior to the onset of the Internet. See Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2007)). For background on the history of copyright law, see Anuj Desai, Big
Entertainment Needs a Sequel to the Highly Anticipated Flop: MGM v. Grokster, 41 GA.
L.R. 579, 584–91 (2007). “At a basic level, the Internet’s technology requires the
insertion of intermediaries between interacting parties in two ways. First, for all
interactions over the Internet, the communication necessarily involves the Internet itself,
as well as the parties necessary to facilitate the particular communications . . . [and
second] commercial transactions on the Internet require the use of other intermediaries.”
Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 254 (2005).
4
“Perhaps the most significant development on the Internet was the World Wide Web,
a user-friendly graphic user interface (“GUI”) and effective means for computers running
different operating systems to communicate with each other. The creator of the World
Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, developed the Web to perpetuate a neutral network built on
end-to-end principles. As neutral and therefore uncontrolled platforms, both the Internet
generally and the Web specifically have spawned a dazzling rate and range of
innovation.” Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network
Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 109–10 (2006); see also TIM BERNERS-LEE & MARK
FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE
WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR (1999).
5
“[T]he Internet is a ‘packet-switched’ network. In such networks, fixed circuits are
not dedicated for the duration of a communication. Instead, the data that is transmitted,
whether files, email, Instant Messages, voice, is broken into small packets. Each packet
travels its own route over the Internet. The entire set of contents is reassembled when it
is received at the other end.” Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 409, 424 (2006).
6
Telecommunications is defined as “the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form
or content of the information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (1997).
Telecommunications service means “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly
to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the
public, regardless of the facilities used.” Id. § 153(46). The Communications Act defines
telecommunications carrier as “any provider of telecommunications services, except that
such term does not include aggregators of telecommunications services (as defined in §
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entertainment content.
Similarly Internet Service Providers
(“ISPs”) qualify for a status that exempts them from liability for
carrying tortious or harmful content, in light of the actual or
perceived burden content scrutiny would impose.8
ISPs now can accrue financial and efficiency gains by
engaging in vertical integration of the production, editing, and
delivery of content.9 Similarly ISPs have upgraded, or soon will
upgrade, their networks with hardware and software that enables
them to acquire knowledge about what kinds of content they
226). A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this Act
only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services, except that
the Commission shall determine whether the provision of fixed and mobile satellite
service shall be treated as common carriage.” Id. § 153(44).
7
Information service is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.” Id. §
153(20). “[T]he language and legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996]
indicate that the drafters . . . regarded telecommunications services and information
services as mutually exclusive categories.” In the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11522–23 (1998). While
information service providers use telecommunications to transmit bitstreams, the FCC
has chosen not to separate this functionality from the information processing that also
occurs. In other words, the FCC considers telecommunications to be subordinate to, and
fully integrated with, the predominant information service. See Vonage Holdings Corp. v.
Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1000–01 (D. Minn. 2003) (applying the
FCC’s dichotomy).
8
Section 509(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1) (1998)), states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”
9
“Vertical integration enables a firm to coordinate investment and production
decisions across its divisions. A comparison of the costs of contractual exchange with
those of internal exchange often reveals vertical integration to be the least-cost method of
achieving the desired level of coordination. The minimization of coordination costs is
extremely important in a market subject to rapid technical change.” J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349, 460 (2006). “Relative to contracting at arm’s length for
network management and for delivery of Internet content and applications, vertical
integration reduces these costs of specifying, monitoring, and enforcing the rules that
direct activities required for the coordinated production of services to end users.” Id. at
461; See also Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and
Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 97–100 (2003).
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switch, route and transmit.10 Such active traffic management can
disqualify ISPs11 from safe harbor12 copyright liability exemptions
for infringement occurring as a result of their carriage of content.13
The decision to engage in active management of content results not
from an affirmative obligation to do so, but instead the desire to
tap new business opportunities accruing from the ability to
scrutinize bitstreams. Such scrutiny can facilitate the prioritization
of traffic into tiers corresponding to different quality of service
commitments. It also can provide notification to ISPs with
10

“Cisco® Service Control technology offers service providers the ability to classify
application traffic and identify subscribers while prioritizing and optimizing network
resources. Using stateful deep packet inspection, operators can optimize traffic on their
networks, thereby increasing efficient use of network resources, reducing costs, and
maximizing capital investment. State-of-the-art bandwidth management can be applied to
network traffic on a global, subscriber, or individual flow-level hierarchy, helping ensure
that operators can better manage network resource distribution.” Cisco Systems,
Optimizing Application Traffic with Cisco Service Control Technology, Solution Overview,
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6150/prod_brochure0900aecd80241955.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2007).
11
The DMCA applies to “service providers” defined in § 512(k)(1)(A) and applicable
to provisions of transitory communications services as “an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications,
between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.” 17 U.S.C § 512. For
three other safe harbor exemptions from liability for copyright infringement “service
provider” is more broadly defined in § 512(k)(l)(B) as “a provider of online services or
network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.” Id.
12
A safe harbor constitutes “[a]n area or means of protection [or a] provision (as in a
statute or regulation) that affords protection from liability or penalty.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004). The DMCA provides qualified immunity from liability
for direct or secondary infringement of copyrighted material that traverses an ISP’s
network. See 17 U.S.C § 512. “Congress enacted the safe harbors in response to
concerns expressed by online service providers about their potentially overwhelming
liability for copyright infringement committed by their users.” Mark A. Lemley & R.
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV., 1345, 1369 (2004).
13
Title II of the DMCA added § 512 to the Copyright Act to create four new
limitations on liability for copyright infringement by online service providers. See 17
U.S.C. § 512 (1999). The limitations are based on the following four categories of
conduct by a service provider: 1) Transitory communications 2) System caching; 3)
Storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users; and 4) Information
location tools. See id. § 512(a)–(d). ISPs lose safe harbor liability exemption when they
have actual knowledge of copyright infringement. See, e.g., id. § 512(c)(1)(A). Each
limitation completely bars monetary damages, and restricts the availability of injunctive
relief. See, e.g., id. § 512(a).
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instructions that make Digital Rights Management (“DRM”)14
more effective. Instead of relying on piracy protection embedded
in files already delivered by an ISP to recipients’ computers, active
scrutiny of traffic possibly can preempt the transmission of pirated
files in the first place in much the same way as an ISP might block
and refuse to deliver unauthorized, harmful and bandwidth
hogging traffic such as spam and computer viruses.
Provided ISPs do not induce copyright infringement, while
feigning no knowledge, case law prior to15 and after enactment of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)16 has exempted
ISPs that operate as neutral conduits. Courts also have exempted
ISPs and other intermediaries17 for the unknowing carriage of

14

Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) refers to the use of technological tools by
copyright owners and distributors to regulate the uses of their works, and in particular to
restrict reproduction. For background on the types of current DRM technologies used to
guard against music piracy, see Nika Aldrich, An Exploration of Rights Management
Technologies Used in the Music Industry, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001
(2007), http://bciptf.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30&Itemid=30.
15
See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding online operator of system for posting comments to
multiple recipients was not liable for direct and vicarious infringement when a subscriber
directly infringed copyrights by posting large portions of copyrighted content).
16
See supra note 13. ISPs that financially benefit from infringement, about which they
know or should know, and can prevent the infringement using affordable means, may
lose the DMCA safe harbor. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005);
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107
(2004). The Grokster case does not impose an affirmative obligation on ISPs to seek out
and install the most effective technology to prevent intellectual property piracy. “[T]his
evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by MGM’s showing that
neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the
infringing activity using their software. While the Ninth Circuit treated the defendants’
failure to develop such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to
monitor their users’ activity, we think this evidence underscores Grokster’s and
StreamCast’s intentional facilitation of their users’ infringement.” 545 U.S. at 939.
However at some point the deliberate refusal to acknowledge blatant piracy and to do
something about it, if technologically and financially feasible, may support the inference
that an ISP actually induces the infringement. ISPs now have both inexpensive
technological resources and the commercial motivation to manage traffic. See Center for
Democracy and Technology, Interpreting Grokster: Limits on the Scope of Secondary
Liability for Copyright Infringement, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2006),
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/CDT-grokster.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
17
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1086 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (DMCA insulates payment intermediaries from claims of copyright infringement);
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defamatory18 or obscene19 content. Conversely, ISPs that actively
manage traffic have recognized the benefit in attempting to restrain
the scope of their traffic management activities to a level below
that which would inform them about illegal content.20 Such safe
harbors absolve ISPs of having to invest the time, money and effort
needed to examine all content. However, new revenue-generating
opportunities have become available to ISPs that use equipment
and software to examine bitstreams so that ISPs can offer different
quality of service levels and otherwise differentiate the treatment
of traffic.21
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 706 (Cal. App. 2002) (online auction site not
liable for sale of counterfeit goods).
18
See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding ISP that operates as a neutral conduit for over 150 special interest forums was
not a publisher for content created by others with management, editing and other control
functions performed by a third party); Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 250 A.D.2d 230,
238 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999) (ISP not responsible when
defamatory comments posted by an imposter); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,
52 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding ISP not liable for defamatory statement posted even when the
ISP pays a monthly fee for the content and has the contract right to control it editorially).
Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Act, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006),
specifies that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983
(10th Cir. 2000) (interpreting § 230 as granting immunity for distribution of inaccurate
stock prices concerning the plaintiff’s business); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
328 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that § 230 conferred immunity on America Online even
though, after several notifications, it did not quickly remove postings falsely portraying
Zeran as celebrating the Oklahoma City bombings); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510,
513 (Cal. 2006) (finding that § 230 creates immunity for a defendant who republishes
defamatory speech regardless whether the ISP acted as more than a completely passive
conduit); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001) (affirming on § 230
immunity grounds the dismissal of a mother’s complaint alleging tort liability against
AOL for retransmitting sexually explicit photographs and a videotape).
19
See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (invalidating law requiring ISPs to disable access to child pornography sites as
overbroad and ineffective).
20
“The source ISP, in contrast, may be involved in multiple ways that are relevant both
in assessing the ‘fairness’ of ‘blaming’ the source ISP for the misconduct . . . and in
assessing how effectively the source ISP can serve as a gatekeeper to stop the
misconduct . . . .” Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 256 (2005).
21
New technologies will enable ISPs to operate non-neutral networks in the sense that
ISPs will have the capability to examine traffic and assign particular streams to different
tiers of service. Traffic examination of this sort does not examine the content, contained
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The ventures that manufacture equipment used to switch, route
and transmit Internet traffic and the carriers providing these
services have a keen interest in shaping a new generation of
Internet services that deviates from a “one size fits all,” least
common denominator.22 By offering customized and diversified
features, ISPs can create new profit centers while more closely
catering to the specific needs of end users and content creators.
Opponents to these initiatives consider them unreasonable price
and quality of service discrimination based on the view that
“network neutrality”23 should provide a level competitive playing
field for all services carried over the World Wide Web. Network
neutrality opponents claim that limits on service diversification
would create disincentives for much-needed infrastructure
investment as well as foreclose opportunities to customize Internet

in the “payload” of packets. Accordingly an ISP would not know whether a particular
bitstream contains obscene or defamatory content. However, examining packet
“headers” would enable the ISP to determine what use, copying and retransmission rights
recipients have for the traffic managed by the ISP. See Alex Pisarevsky, Note, Cope-ing
with the Future: An Examination of the Potential Copyright Liability of Non-Neutral
Networks for Infringing Internet Content, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1359 (2007).
22
“It comes down to this: the industry needs to put forth meaningful ways to identify,
promote and commercialize digital assets while protecting copyright holders. If it
doesn’t, all stakeholders will miss out on the opportunity to generate revenue from IPbased entertainment distribution.” Dr. Matthew Lucas, Peer-To-Peer Networks, DRM
and OSS/BSS, BILLING & OSS WORLD, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.billingworld.com/
articles/feature/Peer-to-Peer-Networks-DRM-and-OSS-BSS.html.
23
“In light of the financial stakes involved in the scope of regulation applied to
conventional, so-called legacy services and new information services, numerous
organizations have pursued a public policy agenda supporting deregulation and the
eradication of government oversight, including traditional regulatory over pricing,
interconnection and quality of service. These groups reject any view that even as
telecommunications becomes less regulated, a new concept of ‘network neutrality’
should force largely unregulated Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to forego the option
of offering differentiated and tiered Internet services. Opponents of net neutrality view
the concept as jeopardizing operational and pricing flexibility. Net neutrality advocates
fervently argue that the Internet cannot achieve maximum contributions to national
productivity, economic opportunity and innovation unless government ensures end-toend connectivity by foreclosing a balkanized or tiered Internet.” Rob Frieden, Network
Neutrality or Bias?—Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171, 174–76 (2007) [hereinafter Frieden, Network
Neutrality or Bias?].
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services, including the offer of “better than best efforts” routing24
for content providers keen on securing more reliable services than
that available from the current, “best efforts”25 delivery standard.
Network neutrality opponents recognize that technological
innovations and diversifying Internet user requirements can create
new or more robust revenue streams. The ability to scan Internet
traffic, through instantaneous examination of bitstreams, makes it
possible for ISPs to offer premium services to both end users and
content providers. Some consumers may willingly pay a premium
for faster, better, and smarter access to content. Candidates for
premium service include users of gaming software, peer-to-peer
file sharing26 and Internet-mediated telephone calls, commonly
referred to as Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”).27
24

See, e.g., T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J.
Spiwak, Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149
(2007); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94
GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006) [hereinafter Yoo, Network Neutrality]; Christopher S. Yoo,
Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13–18 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo,
Beyond Network Neutrality]; Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network
Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 51 (2004) [hereinafter Yoo, Would Mandating
Broadband Help or Hurt Competition?].
25
“TCP/IP routes packets anonymously on a ‘first come, first served’ and ‘best efforts’
basis. Thus, it is poorly suited to applications that are less tolerant of variations in
throughput rates, such as streaming media and VoIP, and is biased against network-based
security features that protect e-commerce and ward off viruses and spam.” Yoo, Beyond
Network Neutrality, supra note 24, at 8.
26
“Emerging peer-to-peer networks destabilized the equilibrium achieved under the
DMCA between copyright owners and ISPs. Peer-to-peer networks facilitate direct
exchange of files among individual users. While infringing materials distributed on the
web involve identifiable websites, the distribution of infringing materials on peer-to-peer
networks is difficult to control. Data is replicated by multiple peers and can be located
by peers without relying on a central index server. The distributed architecture of peerto-peer networks makes it difficult to identify the source of infringing materials and to
locate the infringers.” Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of
Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15,
17 (2005–06).
27
Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) offers voice communications capabilities,
much like ordinary telephone service, using the packet switched Internet, for all or part of
the link between call originator and call recipient. VoIP calls originating or terminating
over the standard dial-up telephone network require conversion from or to the standard
telephone network’s architecture that creates a dedicated “circuit-switched” link, as
opposed to the ad hoc, “best efforts” packet switching used in the Internet. See Robert
Cannon, State Regulatory Approaches to VoIP: Policy, Implementation, and Outcome, 57
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Similarly, some content and service providers may willingly pay
for enhancements that provide more protection and privacy and
greater reliability that traffic will arrive in a timely manner to a
large, possibly temporary audience of prospective customers.
Candidates for a premium service typically have higher
bandwidth requirements, less tolerance for dropped, lost or delayed
packet delivery and generate more traffic volume than typical
users. To accommodate these requirements manufacturers have
developed equipment that can examine and prioritize Internet
traffic at an increasingly granular level. While ISPs previously
lacked both the technological wherewithal and the incentive to
deviate from plain vanilla best efforts,28 they now have the
capacity to inspect traffic on a packet-by-packet basis. The ability
to “sniff” packets makes it possible for ISPs to deviate from “best
efforts” routing by discriminating on the basis of price paid for
service and as a function of what kind of traffic a bitstream
represents. Deep packet inspection29 makes it possible for ISPs to
FED. COMM. L.J. 479, 484 (2005); Mark C. Del Bianco, Voices Past: The Present and
Future of VoIP Regulation, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 365, 368 (2006); Robert M.
Frieden, Dialing for Dollars: Should the FCC Regulate Internet Telephony?, 23 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 47 (1997) [hereinafter Frieden, Dialing for Dollars]; Chérie R.
Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the Horizon: Are Regulators Poised to Address
the Status of IP Telephony?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 19, 21 (2003); Sunny Lu, Note,
Cellco Partnership v. FCC & Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission: VoIP’s Shifting Legal and Political Landscape, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
859, 861 (2005).
28
Prior to 1995 the United States government largely underwrote development of the
Internet by funding two major backbone networks, the ARAPANET and NSFNet and by
serving as an anchor tenant user of these networks. “The ‘Internet’ is a worldwide
system of computer networks and individual computers that are interconnected by
communications facilities. The antecedents of the Internet were systems for two
relatively small groups of research-oriented governmental, academic and corporate
entities—ARPANET and NSFNET. ARPANET received its principal support from the
Department of Defense and related agencies, while NSFNET’s support came from
numerous sources, including the NSF and other federal agencies, academic institutions,
and corporate sponsors.” Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
289, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (references omitted). Network operators funded by the United
States government and keen on promoting greater accessibility to the Internet and
connectivity of networks had little interest in measuring traffic levels and charging
network operators that generated more traffic than they received.
29
“Deep packet inspection uses specialized high-speed hardware and software that can
identify packets in real-time. A service provider could use deep packet inspection to
distinguish peer-to-peer traffic or even just traffic from a single peer-to-peer file-sharing
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diversify service on the basis of allocated bandwidth, routing
priority and performance guarantees. It also may prevent an ISP
from turning a blind eye to “red flags” generated by the process of
deep packet inspection evidencing obvious infringement even
before a copyright holder notifies the ISPs of the infraction.30
Likewise, Digital Rights Management31 functions integrated into
application and either block it or reduce its available bandwidth. Without deep packet
inspection, service providers and others could only resort to crude application-level
techniques, such as cutting off all streaming video clips using standard formats after a
certain time.” Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for
the Digital Age, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 92 (2005). “Depending on how net
neutrality is defined, it can be argued that there are widespread violations of the principle.
Vertically integrated incumbents are expanding their tactics from the shotgun approach of
blocking to a more nuanced approach. In the United States particularly, incumbents are
looking to increase their broadband revenue streams not by blocking, but by
discrimination, charging more for faster download speeds or for certain types of traffic
sent by unaffiliated parties. This approach is greatly facilitated by new filtering and
‘deep packet inspection’ network-management tools that allow service providers to
determine the types of traffic flowing across their networks. With these tools, network
operators can offer improved speeds—and, conversely, to block or degrade the service—
for specific types of traffic.” Del Bianco, supra note 27, at 394–95.
30
The Committee Report on the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006), provides more
expansive insights on the meaning of the language contained in the law. While the
DMCA does not expressly contain a “red flag” test for assessing whether an ISP has
actual knowledge of copyright infringement, the Committee Report suggests the
reasonableness of such a test when evaluating the appropriateness of safe harbors for
ISPs storing and linking to copyright infringing content. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)–(d). For
example, the Committee Report suggests that § 512 (c)(1)(A)(ii) establishes such a red
flag test: “if the service provider becomes aware of a ‘red flag’ from which infringing
activity is apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no action. The ‘red
flag’ test has both a subjective and an objective element. In determining whether the
service provider was aware of a ‘red flag,’ the subjective awareness of the service
provider of the facts or circumstances in question must be determined. However, in
deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a ‘red flag’—in other words,
whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating
under the same or similar circumstances—an objective standard should be used.” H.R.
REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998) [hereinafter DMCA Committee Report].
Addressing linkage to sites probably containing infringing material the DMCA
Committee Report suggests the reasonableness of a similar red flag test: “a service
provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not
qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious
infringement.” Id. at 57.
31
Copyright holders increasingly rely on digital rights management “technologies that
prevent you from using a copyrighted digital work beyond the degree to which the
copyright owner wishes to allow you to use it.” MIKE GODWIN, WHAT EVERY CITIZEN
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DRM, A.K.A. “DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT,” 1 (2004),
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deep packet inspection may become a standard technical
component that ISPs can avoid only at the risk of losing the
DMCA safe harbors.32
An ISP able to examine packets for purposes of assigning
bitstreams into various tiers of service also provides an ISP with
greater knowledge about the nature and type of the traffic it
handles.33 Arguably, an ISP engaging in quality of service
(“QOS”) and price discrimination through deep packet inspection
no longer operates as a neutral conduit lacking actual or
constructive knowledge of what the packets represent. ISPs that
sniff packets actively examine the header of packets that provide
traffic routing information, but also can identify characteristics of
the content “payload” contained in the packet. For example, the
packet header can identify the payload as a portion of a music file
and can specify the intellectual property rights retained by the
owner of the content as well as the usage and copying
opportunities available to the recipient.

http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/citizens_guide_to_drm.pdf; see also Dan L. Burk,
Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 537, 538 (2005).
32
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2002) conditions ISP safe harbor eligibility on their
accommodation and noninterference with “standard technical measures” to identify and
protect copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(A)–(C) defines these measures as
ones that “have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and
service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process; are
available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and do not impose
substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or
networks.”
33
In addition to packet switching, equipment manufacturers and ISPs have a keen
interest in new traffic switching, routing and transmitting architectures that provide
greater flexibility in tiering and managing traffic. One promising design, IP Multimedia
Subsystem (“IMS”), offers both wireline and wireless carriers greater control over the
quality of service in setting up and managing telephone calls and data sessions. This
management enhancement extends to the software and service applications that ride on a
bitstream transmission path. For background on IMS, see Light Reading, IMS Guide
(Mar. 24, 2005), http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=70728 (last visited
Nov. 26, 2007); Nortel, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Solution,
http://www2.nortel.com/go/solution_content.jsp?segId=0&catId=0&parId=0&prod_id=5
2540 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).

FRIEDEN_022508_FINAL

2008]

2/25/2008 7:19:18 PM

INTERNET PACKET SNIFFING

645

The output of affordable deep packet inspection and other
technologies34 now available to ISPs raises questions whether nonneutral network operation disqualifies ISPs for a safe harbor
exemption from liability for carrying copyright infringing traffic
provided by § 512 of the DMCA.35 Operators of next generation
Internet networks will have the technological capability and
commercial motivation to deviate from operating as neutral
conduits, but the possibility exists that they have not fully assessed
the legal and financial consequences vis-à-vis the intellectual
property rights of the content creators whose work they carry.
The sometimes acrimonious debate over network neutrality has
largely ignored whether ISPs engaging in packet inspection risk
losing a valuable exemption from liability for contributory
copyright infringement and vicarious liability. Likewise the debate
has not addressed the impact of non-neutral network operation on
the balance of power between consumers and creators of
intellectual property. Arguably ISPs will have much greater
capability to protect intellectual property rights, in light of the
contractual QOS commitments they make to specific customers
and the enhanced knowledge of the nature and type of the traffic
that traverses their networks. Such technological capability may
further condition or eliminate the DMCA safe harbor because ISPs
may no longer claim they lack “actual knowledge that the material
or an activity using the material on the system or network is
infringing.”36
34

The capabilities of IMS trigger the same fear as deep packet inspection in terms of
depriving users routing flexibility and tiering services. “IMS is all about the core
network being smart enough, and tied so tightly to applications that it allows the network
to become application aware. Now the network is USER aware, and protocol aware.
What does this mean? This means the network can very tightly control packets. IMS
knows what kind of packets are on the network, set prioritization based on the types of
packets, and even prioritization by end-user or content provider. The sneakiest
component of IMS is the ‘Policy Management Component.’ This section was just
glossed over in the session, but warning bells immediately went off in my head. POLICY
MANAGEMENT. Now the network can automatically discriminate and control my bits.
They can control content provider bits. They can differentiate on ANYTHING and
ANYONE.” Jules.ca, IMS—The Fruits of the Devil? (Nov. 12, 2006),
http://jules.squarespace.com/jules-dot-ca/2006/11/12/ims-the-fruits-of-the-devil.html.
35
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2360
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (Supp. 2002)) (“DMCA”).
36
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2002).
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This Article will examine the current debate about Internet
neutrality in terms of its impact on intellectual property rights,
including consumers’ fair use opportunities. The Article will
assess whether and how ISPs might lose their safe harbor for
copyright infringement liability based on new technological means
to know about the content they carry. Additionally, the Article
will consider whether ISPs have an affirmative duty to conduct
packet inspection absent a legislative mandate. The Article also
will examine the applicability of litigation37 over mandatory
processing of broadcast television “flags,”38 which specify
consumer use options, but which require equipment processing on
user premises.
The Article concludes that ISPs’ regulatory status as
information service providers does not provide an absolute
exemption from responsibilities to examine the content they carry
and to provide reasonable safeguards for protecting copyrights,
including the possible retention and disclosure of logs that can help
identify and punish copyright infringement and other unlawful
activities. Such affirmative efforts to protect creators’ intellectual
property rights might limit, condition, or eliminate consumers’ fair
use opportunities and privacy expectations.
I. NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
In quick succession the Internet has evolved from a
collaborative project among governments and universities to a
commercial medium operated primarily by private ventures.39 The

37

Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The broadcast video flag is “a content-protection signal that broadcasters may choose
to embed into a digital broadcast transmission as a way to prevent unauthorized
redistribution of [Digital Television] DTV content.” BRIAN T. YEH, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF DIGITAL
TELEVISION: THE BROADCAST VIDEO FLAG (2007), http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/
crs/RL33797-070111.pdf.
39
For background on how the Internet evolved from a government underwritten project
to a privatized and commercialized medium, see Rob Frieden, Revenge of the Bellheads:
How the Netheads Lost Control of the Internet, 26 TELECOMM. POL’Y 425, 425–44 (2002)
[hereinafter Frieden, Revenge of the Bellheads]; see also Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G.
Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel,
38
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first generation Internet used government subsidies to build a
robust medium capable of routing electronic mail around outages
to users in widely dispersed locations. The government agencies,
contractors and universities linked via this Internet emphasized
expansion and network connectivity with little regard for the cost
of service largely because government underwriting obviated close
scrutiny of cost causation. Even if operators wanted to determine
traffic flows, measurement tools lacked sufficient calibration and
generated significant costs by reducing the amount of payload
traffic that carriers could handle.
Conceptualizing the Internet as a “network of networks,”40 first
generation Internet operators cooperated on interconnection
arrangements with an eye toward promoting the accessibility and
reach of the Internet. The first interconnection agreements
between ISPs refrained from exact route mapping and traffic
metering, instead relying on the Transmission Control Protocol to
route traffic “on the fly” based on current conditions as opposed to
fixed routing used by telephone companies.41 ISPs initially
refrained from metering traffic based on the expectation that traffic
volumes were roughly equivalent and the cost of metering was not
worth the bother in light of the availability of external government
funding.
The United States largely abandoned its underwriter and
anchor tenant role in 1995 with the decommissioning of NSFNet,

Larry G. Roberts & Stephen Wolff, A Brief History of the Internet,
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
40
“The Internet is a network of networks, and its utility largely depends on the
principle of universal interconnectivity. This is true both as a technical and as an
economic matter.” James B. Speta, FCC Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It
and Limiting It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 31 (2003). “In particular, the routes packets
traverse is dynamically determined through addresses carried in the packets themselves.
If a particular communication link is busy, the packet will be routed through a lesscongested path. In theory—this occurs much less often in practice—each packet of a
communication may travel a different route to its destination.” Susan Landau, National
Security on the Line, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 409, 424 (2006).
41
“TCP/IP routes packets anonymously on a ‘first come, first served’ and ‘best efforts’
basis. Thus, it is poorly suited to applications that are less tolerant of variations in
throughput rates, such as streaming media and VoIP, and is biased against network-based
security features that protect e-commerce and ward off viruses and spam.” See Yoo,
Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 24, at 8.
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the major backbone network funded by the National Science
Foundation.42 The ensuing privatization of the Internet forced
operators to pay closer attention to infrastructure costs and traffic
streams with an eye toward recovering costs from the responsible
parties. ISPs largely abandoned the offer of zero cost network
access to other ISPs, known as peering, except for similarly sized
counterparts with matching traffic, available bandwidth, and
geographical reach. Smaller ISPs now must pay for “transiting”43
access to larger ISPs’ networks and the access these ISPs have
secured to other ISPs’ networks.
The Internet’s developing third generation44 appears poised to
exploit technological innovations, expanding broadband access and
converging markets with even greater service diversity and market
segmentation. This next generation45 World Wide Web will not
appear as a standard, “one size fits” all medium primarily because
consumers will expect more and different features. For example,
online game players and VoIP 46 users will require “better than
42

See supra note 26.
Internet transiting refers to a traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees to
accept traffic for onward routing for compensation. Transiting involves a settlement and
payment of funds because one ISP requires access to the links, subscribers and content
available via another ISP’s network and its peering arrangements. “Transit is the
business relationship whereby one ISP provides (usually sells) access to all destinations
in its routing table.” WILLIAM B. NORTON, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND PEERING,
DRAFT 2.5, 1 (May 30, 2001) http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/PeeringWP.2.pdf.
44
The Internet’s first generation emphasized network expansion and efforts to promote
connectivity with little regard for cost, because a third party (government) subsidized
such efforts. The second generation marked a migration from government subsidization
to private, commercial network operation. The ongoing migration to a third generation
appears to emphasize diversification of services, prices and quality as ISPs pursue price
and QOS discrimination opportunities. See, e.g., International Telecommunication Union,
What Rules for IP-enabled NGN?, Workshop (March 23–24, 2006), available at
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ngn/event-march-2006.phtml (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
45
See, e.g., id.
46
Voice over the Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) refers to the use of the Internet to carry
and deliver on a real time, immediate basis packets of data that correspond to a voice
conversation. VoIP services range in quality, reliability and price and can link both
computers and ordinary telephone handsets. For technical background on how VoIP
works, see Stephen E. Blythe, The Regulation of Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol in the
United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161
(2005); SUSAN SPRADLEY & ALAN STODDARD, TUTORIAL ON TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVOLUTION TO VOIP, POWER POINT PRESENTATION (2003),
http://www.fcc.gov/oet/tutorial/9-22-03_voip-final_slides_only.ppt (last visited Nov. 24,
43
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best efforts” 47 routing of bits and presumably will accept the
obligation to pay for less delay, jitter48 and dropped packets.49
Already privacy, QOS and other factors support efforts to offer
users the benefit of private networking with conditional and
managed access via the public Internet. Similarly content
providers can use caching50 and premium traffic routing and

2007). See also Del Bianco, supra note 27; R. Alex DuFour, Voice Over Internet
Protocol: Ending Uncertainty and Promoting Innovation Through a Regulatory
Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 471 (2005); Jerry Ellig and Alastair Walling,
Regulatory Status of VoIP in the Post-Brand X World, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 89 (2006); Amy L. Leisinger, If It Looks Like a Duck: The Need for
Regulatory Parity in VoIP Telephony, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 585 (2006).
47
“The Internet is a vast network of individual computers and computer networks that
communicate with each other using the same communications language, Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The Internet consists of approximately
more than 100 million computers around the world using TCP/IP protocols. Along with
the development of TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the
following characteristics or parameters: 1. Each distinct network stands on its own with
its own specific environment and user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP
to connect to other parts of the Internet. Communications are not directed in a unilateral
fashion. Rather, communications are routed throughout the Internet on a best efforts
basis in which some packets of information may go through one series of computer
networks and other packets of information go through a different permutation or
combination of computer networks, with all of these information packets eventually
arriving at their intended destination. 2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect
the various networks; these boxes are called ‘gateways’ and ‘routers.’ The gateways and
routers do not retain information but merely provide access and flow for the packets
being transmitted. 3. There is no global control of the Internet.” Konrad L. Trope, Voice
Over Internet Protocol: The Revolution in America’s Telecommunications Infrastructure,
&
INTERNET
LAWYER,
Dec.
2005,
available
at
COMPUTER
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-12328904_ITM.
48
“When you browse the Web, for example, you generate little or no traffic while
you’re reading a page, but there is a burst of traffic when your browser needs to fetch a
new page from a server. If a network provider is using minimal delay discrimination, and
the high-priority traffic is bursty, then low-priority traffic will usually sail through the
network with little delay, but will experience noticeable delay whenever there is a burst
of high-priority traffic. The technical term for this kind of on-again, off-again delay is
‘jitter.’” EDWARD W. FELTEN, CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. POLICY, NUTS AND BOLTS OF
NETWORK NEUTRALITY (2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf.
49
For services that need immediate, “real time” packet delivery, e.g., streaming audio
and video, any failure to receive packets in time and in proper sequence will result in a
noticeable degradation in service quality. The packets are lost and cannot be resent.
50
Caching refers to intermediate and temporary storage of data. “Google makes and
analyzes a copy of each Web page that it finds, and stores the HTML code from those
pages in a temporary repository called a cache.” Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d
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management service to secure more reliable service than that
available from best efforts routing.
Service diversification can require many reasonable and lawful
types of discrimination between Internet users notwithstanding a
heritage in the first two generations of nondiscrimination and best
efforts routing of traffic. Most ISPs offer access on an unmetered,
monthly subscription basis, but some ISPs already offer different
levels of bit delivery speeds to subscribers. Likewise ISPs
increasingly have the ability to examine individual traffic streams51
and prioritize them creating a dichotomy between plain vanilla,
best efforts routing and more expensive, superior traffic
management services.
“[T]he potential exists for carriers operating the major
networks used to switch and route bitstreams to go beyond
satisfying diverse [consumer] requirements . . . .”52 Advocates for
the principle of network neutrality53 claim the potential exists for
ISPs to engineer a fragmented and “balkanized” next generation
Internet to achieve anticompetitive goals.54 The worst case
1106, 1110 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that the DMCA provides a “safe harbor” exemption
from liability for making cached copies of copyrighted works).
51
“A packet sniffer (also known as a network analyzer or protocol analyzer or, for
particular types of networks, an Ethernet sniffer or wireless sniffer) is computer software
or computer hardware that can intercept and log traffic passing over a digital network or
part of a network. As data streams flow across the network, the sniffer captures each
packet and eventually decodes and analyzes its content according to the appropriate RFC
or other specifications.” Packet Sniffer, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_
sniffer (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (emphasis omitted).
52
Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network
Neutrality Debate, INT’L. J. OF COMM. (forthcoming), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9455&context=expresso (last visited
Nov. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Frieden, Internet 3.0].
53
For links to a representative sample of advocacy papers and analyses of network
neutrality, see Papers, Conferences & Surveys—National Regulatory Research Institute,
http://www.nrri.ohio-state.edu/Telecom/hot-topics-links/net-neutrality/papers (last visited
Nov. 24, 2007). See also Frieden, Internet 3.0, supra note 52; Frieden, Network
Neutrality or Bias?, supra note 23.
54
See, e.g., Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common
Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483 (2006);
Brett Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an
Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. (forthcoming
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014691; Mark
A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of
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scenario envisioned by network neutrality advocates is a reduction
in innovation, efficiency, consumer benefits, and national
productivity occasioned by a divided Internet: one medium prone
to congestion and declining reliability and one offering superior
performance and potential competitive advantages to users able
and willing to pay, or affiliated with the ISP operating the
bitstream transmission network.55 Opponents of network neutrality
mandates scoff at the possibility of the worst-case scenario and
view government intervention as anathema.56

the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001); Barbara van Schewick,
Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 329 (2007); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=388863.
55
See Jeff Chester, The End of the Internet?, THE NATION, Feb. 1, 2006,
www.thenation.com/doc/20060213/chester;
Freepress:
Net
Freedom
Now!,
http://www.freepress.net/deadend/=neutrality, available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20070410094102/http://www.freepress.net/deadend/=neutrality (last visited Apr. 10,
2007)
(on
file
with
author);
Net
Neutrality—Common
Cause,
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=1421497 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007); Andrew Raff, IPTAblog: Net Neutrality Reading List,
http://www.iptablog.org/2006/02/28/net_neutrality_reading_list.html (Feb. 28, 2006,
20:49 EST); TREVOR R. ROYCROFT, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND NETWORK NEUTRALITY:
SEPARATING EMPIRICAL FACTS FROM THEORETICAL FICTION (Issue Brief Prepared for
Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union and free Press) (2006),
http://www.freepress.net/docs/roycroft_study.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2007); Save the
Internet: Fighting for Internet Freedom, http://www.savetheinternet.com (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007); Tim Wu, Why You Should Care About Network Neutrality, The Future of
the Internet Depends on it!, SLATE, May 1, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2140850.
56
See Raymond L. Gifford, The Internet Left Gets a Case of the Vapors, PROGRESS
SNAPSHOT RELEASE 2 (The Progress & Freedom Foundation) June 15, 2006, available at
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2006/ps_2.15_intenet_left.pdf; Thomas W. Hazlett,
Neutering the Net, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, available at http://news.ft.com/cms/s/
392ad708-b837-11da-bfc5-0000779e2340.html; David P. McClure, Network Neutrality:
Phantom Problem, Unintended Consequences (U.S. Internet Industry Association), Mar.
14, 2006, http://www.usiia.org/pubs/NNPrimer.doc; NET NEUTRALITY OR NET
NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED (Thomas M.
Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006); J. Gregory Sidak, Visiting Professor of Law,
Georgetown University, Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Feb. 7, 2006) (transcript available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/sidak-020706.pdf); J. Gregory Sidak, A ConsumerWelfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 349 (2006); Adam Thierer, Are ‘Dumb Pipe’ Mandates Smart Public Policy?
Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005); Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 24; Yoo,
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A. Deep Packet Inspection and Digital Rights Management
ISPs engaging in price and QOS discrimination must engage in
active network management. Rather than operate as a neutral
conduit with no reason to examine the nature and types of traffic
that traverse their networks, ISPs keen on taping new service
diversification opportunities, have to use technologies that examine
the packets the ISPs will switch, route and deliver. Next
generation Internet routing equipment provides operators the
ability to “sniff” and inspect specific packet streams so that the ISP
can perform a number of revenue generating functions including
the assignment of traffic to regular or priority subnetworks,
guarding against theft of service, and filtering out spam.57
Such packet inspection also provides ISPs with a greater ability
to determine whether the traffic they carry respects all intellectual
property rights of the content creator. In other words, packet
sniffing provides the means for ISPs to determine whether their
network has become a medium for the unlawful transport of files
to recipients lacking lawful authority to consume, copy, and share
intellectual property.58
Internet equipment providers recognize the market opportunity
created by deeper and more granular traffic inspection:
In order to deal with the increasingly competitive
broadband market, service providers need the tools
that allow them to differentiate services not only by
bandwidth tiers, but on application and content
bases as well. And because of the increasing
diversity of stakeholder needs, such as the use of
Network Neutrality, supra note 24; Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Help or Hurt
Competition?, supra note 24.
57
“Deep packet inspection (DPI) technology allows service providers to peer inside
next-generation network (NGN) packets to see what users are up to – what applications
they are using, where their traffic is going, and so on. It all sounds distinctly Orwellian,
but it seems that service providers are embracing the concept with enthusiasm.” Light
Reading.com, Deep Packet Inspection, http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?
doc_id=111404 (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
58
For discussion about the differences between actual knowledge of copyright
infringement and notification about the possibility of such infringement, see Emily
Zarins, Notice Versus Knowledge Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Safe
Harbors, 92 CAL. L. REV. 257 (2004).
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P2P applications . . . they must be able to
differentiate the online experience of individual
users—not by IP address alone, but through the
identification of individual users by name. . . . The
Cisco Service Control Engine combines deep packet
inspection with specific subscriber identification,
allowing the service provider to properly segment
its customer base and provide individualized
services to differing demographic ‘clusters.’ As a
result, the service provider competes on factors
other than price, and can generate incremental
revenue from application-based services rendered.59
Cisco, a major Internet equipment manufacturer, also states
that its traffic interrogation capabilities offer “the ability to identify
traffic streams of individual users, and control application and
network use differentially based on assigned ‘online’ rights,
[thereby] ensur[ing] protection of critical applications [and]
network fairness . . . .”60
B. Network Neutrality Qualifies ISPs for Copyright Infringement
Safe Harbors
Currently, § 512 of the DMCA61 provides ISPs with
conditional exemptions from direct or secondary liability for
copyright infringement that occurs over their networks. In an
effort to balance the obligation to protect copyright holders with an
interest in promoting investment in the Internet and its use as an
engine for commerce, Congress included in the DMCA a chapter
entitled the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act.62 The DMCA establishes four safe harbor exemptions from
liability for online “service providers”63 when they operate as a
neutral, transitory conduit for content, engage in temporary
caching or storing of content, and when they provide search tools
59
Cisco Service Control Engine: Q & A, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/
ps6151/products_qanda_item0900aecd8041c9d4.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
60
Id.
61
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2007).
62
See Ellison v. Roberston, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
63
See supra note 11 (explaining the DMCA’s definitions of “service provider”).
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that link to information created by others.64 The DMCA generally
bars any monetary damages for direct, contributory, and vicarious
infringements of ISPs provided they conform with the statute’s
safe harbor provisions.65 It also restricts the availability of
injunctive relief for copyright holders.66
To qualify for these safe harbors ISPs must not have actively
participated in the placement and selection of the content, or
determined who shall receive the content.67 The ISP cannot
benefit materially from the infringement,68 but courts have differed
in their common law and DMCA interpretations of what ISPs can
do in terms of revenue generation without triggering liability for
contributory infringement.69 Of particular importance in light of
the network neutrality debate, ISPs cannot know about the
infringement70 and must take affirmative steps to remove offending
materials about which it has received notice,71 as well as terminate
service to repeat infringers.72 ISPs also must accommodate and
cannot interfere with “standard technical measures” used to
identify and protect copyrighted works. 73 However the DMCA
provides no guidance about technical measures installed and
applied by an ISP as opposed to measures embedded in the content
by the copyright holder. A “red flag” standard suggested in the
64

See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076–77.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(e).
66
See id. § 512(j).
67
See id. § 512(a)(1)–(3).
68
See id. § 512(c)(1)(B). The DMCA safe harbor for the storage of copyright
infringing content requires that in addition to not having had actual knowledge of and
timely removing the infringing content, the ISP cannot “receive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has
the right and ability to control such activity.” Id.
69
Compare Costar Group v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704–05 (D. Md.
2001) (holding that defendant’s website that permitted real estate brokers to post listings
did not accrue direct financial benefit because, amongst other considerations, the
defendant did not charge for user access), aff’d, 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004), with
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (granting
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part on a finding that defendant very
likely received direct financial benefit from infringing activity in light of its revenue
accrual based on number of subscribers and visits to infringing sites).
70
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).
71
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C), (d)(3).
72
Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
73
Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
65
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Committee Report on the DMCA74 would not obligate ISPs to
engage in active monitoring of content that ISPs store or provide
links to,75 nor would it automatically eliminate the safe harbor
whenever the ISP examined content using technical or human
resources.76 On the other hand, when “the infringing nature of
such sites would be apparent from even a brief and casual viewing,
safe harbor status for a provider that views such a site and then
establishes a link to it would not be appropriate.”77
Safe harbors for storage and linking to infringing material
emphasize the need for ISPs to lack actual knowledge about
infringing activity, including facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent. Courts found that Internet ventures
such as Napster78 and Grokster79 induced infringing activity and
surely knew or should have known that it frequently occurred.
These ventures received a financial benefit directly attributable to
the infringing activities80 and they also had the “right and ability”81
to control such conduct.
74
COMM. ON COMMERCE, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, H.R. DOC.
NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998).
75
See id. “[A] service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright
infringement, but it would not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to
‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.” Id. at 57.
76
See id. at 57–58 (“A question has been raised as to whether a service provider would
be disqualified from the safe harbor based solely on evidence that it had viewed the
infringing Internet site. If so, there is concern that on-line directories prepared by human
editors and reviewers, who view and classify various Internet sites, would be denied
eligibility to the information location tools safe harbor, in an unintended number of cases
and circumstances. . . . For instance, the copyright owner could show that the provider
was aware of facts from which infringing activity was apparent if the copyright owner
could prove that the location was clearly, at the time the directory provider viewed it, a
‘pirate’ site . . . where sound recordings, software, movies, or books were available for
unauthorized downloading, public performance, or public display. Absent such ‘red
flags’ or actual knowledge, a directory provider would not be similarly aware merely
because it saw one or more well known photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to
that person. The provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief
cataloguing visit, to determine whether the photograph was still protected by copyright or
was in the public domain; if the photograph was still protected by copyright, whether the
use was licensed; and if the use was not licensed, whether it was permitted under the fair
use doctrine.”).
77
Id. at 58.
78
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2001).
79
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937–41 (2005).
80
See id. at 939–40; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
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ISPs operating in a network neutral environment qualify for the
safe harbor exemption from copyright infringement liability.
Nevertheless, it follows that to qualify for the safe harbor ISPs
might have to eschew deep packet inspection or limit its nature and
scope because this process would evidence a non-neutral
operating environment where the ISP has the ability to know when
copyright infringement takes place. ISPs may soon view network
neutrality obligations contained in the DMCA as providing a less
valuable safe harbor if it forecloses their use of deep packet
inspection.
C. Non Neutral Network Operation May Lose the DMCA
Safe Harbor
ISPs deploying deep packet inspection have maximum
flexibility to pursue price and QOS discrimination at the likely loss
of the DMCA § 512 safe harbors. Arguably deep packet
inspection constitutes an affirmative effort on the part of the ISP to
monitor the flow of packets traversing the ISP’s network. While
monitoring by itself may not eliminate the safe harbor
qualification, deep packet monitoring probably does because the
packet header information likely will identify significant
information about the nature and type of traffic sufficient to put the
ISP on actual notice of any copyright infringement. While the ISP
needs only information about QOS and other features for which a
particular user and user generated traffic stream qualifies, the ISPs
cannot lawfully ignore copyright status if such information
becomes part of the standard header information ISPs routinely
inspect and process.82
The header information contained in packets, subject to
inspection, can provide information sufficient for automated
decision making regarding the QOS and other diversified services
available to ISP traffic. Such automation empowers information
processing equipment and software to make binding decisions
about the treatment of specific bitstreams quite possibly without

81

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (1999).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (conditioning ISP safe harbor eligibility on their
accommodation and non-interference with “standard” DRM techniques).
82
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any human involvement. The judgments made by computer chips
and code will have a profound impact on how bitstreams are
treated during their journey through one or more ISP networks and
possibly also what recipients of the traffic can do with the content
after receiving it.
1. The Significance of Where and Why Packet
Inspection Occurs
ISPs offering tiered Internet services typically will need to
inspect packets using equipment located on the ISPs’ premises as
part of the process for assigning traffic to superior or regular
treatment. In other words, when ISPs take affirmative steps to
operate non-neutral networks, they have explicitly decided to
probe traffic and to subject them to differential treatment based on
what the packet headers disclose. ISPs can lawfully deploy deep
packet inspection because this functionality occurs at ISP
locations, using ISP equipment and most likely with notice, if not
express approval by the subscriber.
Voluntary deep packet inspection contrasts with regulatorcompelled examination and processing of similar type header
information, e.g., broadcast “flags,”83 using consumer electronic
devices. In American Library Ass’n v. FCC,84 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected as beyond the FCC’s
jurisdiction a mandate for compulsory processing of copyright
protection directives by consumers’ digital television receivers.85
The court rejected the FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction over any

83

See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The broadcast
flag is a digital code embedded in a . . . broadcasting stream, which prevents digital
television reception equipment from redistributing broadcast content . . . .”). “The
effectiveness of the broadcast flag regime is dependent on programming being flagged
and on devices capable of receiving broadcast DTV signals (collectively ‘demodulator
products’) being able to recognize and give effect to the flag.” Id. at 693.
84
Id.
85
See id. at 693 (“The broadcast flag does not have any impact on a DTV broadcast
transmission. The flag’s only effect is to limit the capacity of [a consumer’s] receiver
apparatus to redistribute broadcast content after a broadcast transmission is complete.”);
id. at 692 (“Title I [of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq.] does not authorize the Commission to regulate receiver apparatus after a
transmission is complete.”).
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demodulator product, if that demodulator product was needed to
process and enforce the copy protection flag:
the Flag Order does not require demodulator
products to give effect to the broadcast flag until
after the DTV broadcast is complete. The Flag
Order does not regulate the actual transmission of
the DTV broadcast. In other words, the Flag Order
imposes regulations on devices that receive
communications after those communications have
occurred; it does not regulate the communications
themselves. Because the demodulator products are
not engaged in ‘communication by wire or radio’
when they are subject to regulation under the Flag
Order, the Commission plainly exceeded the scope
of its general jurisdictional grant under Title I in
this case.86
The broadcast flag case prevents the FCC from extending its
regulatory authority over equipment that receives or processes
signals over which the FCC does have jurisdiction.87 It follows
that the FCC could not extend its jurisdiction over consumers’
computers, including ones that attach to telecommunications links
over which the Commission has jurisdiction. Likewise it follows
that should an ISP elect to activate flag and header processing,
ostensibly to have the capability to differentiate traffic streams, the
ISP can create a non-neutral network environment, either with the
express permission of its subscribers or because it uses its own
equipment and does not trespass and take control over subscribers’
equipment. Just as the FCC cannot effectuate a copyright
protection scheme that would require it to extend its jurisdiction
impermissibly, ISPs can activate a copyright protection scheme—
intentionally or otherwise—when using their own equipment to
inspect packet headers without trespassing or otherwise intruding
on equipment located on users’ premises.
D. The Implausibility of Activating a Non-Neutral Network That

86
87

Id. at 703.
See id. at 703–05.
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Ignores Copyright, or Deep Packet Inspection That Retains
Network Neutrality
In light of the value accruing from DMCA safe harbors, ISPs
may attempt to claim that deep packet inspection can occur without
impacting ISPs’ knowledge of whether copyright infringement has
occurred. Similarly an ISP might claim that, notwithstanding its
use of deep packet inspection, the ISP will continue to comply with
the spirit of network neutrality. In application, deep packet
inspection appears to offer an all or nothing value proposition:
either an ISP has the ability to examine content and to discriminate
on the basis of several different QOS variables or it does not. To
argue that an ISP can discriminate and still qualify for DMCA safe
harbors and respect network neutrality would require creative
interpretation of what constitutes network neutrality and “actual
knowledge” of copyright infringement.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES NETWORK NEUTRALITY?
At its core, network neutrality requires ISPs to eschew many
types of price and QOS discrimination, on grounds that consumers
deserve the right to access any Internet service on equal footing
and service providers should have the same technological means
for reaching consumers. In other words, consumers and content
providers should not have to put up with tactics, such as deep
packet inspection, that could identify packets and prioritize them,
possibly resulting in a superior/inferior dichotomy of packet
processing and delivery.
The fairness and nondiscrimination aspects of network
neutrality may differ in terms of how ISPs serve end users versus
how ISPs process traffic. Some, but not all, network neutrality
advocates would accept tiered and differentiated service to end
users based on such variables as allocated bandwidth, anticipated
bitstream delivery speeds, and amount of content that a subscriber
can upload and download in one month. Such “customer tiering”
would offer different prices based on legitimate customer
differentials thereby eliminating subsidies flowing from low
volume users to high volume users when both groups pay the same
flat, “all-you-can-eat” subscription rate that ISPs typically offer.
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Network neutrality advocates uniformly oppose accesstiering88 that would use techniques, such as deep packet inspection,
to identify the source and type of traffic with an eye toward
bifurcating service into superior, better than best efforts service
and regular best efforts routing. Advocates for network neutrality
worry that access tiering will create artificial congestion and an
inferior Internet service environment for anyone refusing to pay for
premium service.
Incumbent carriers and like minded opponents to network
neutrality have characterized their opposition to network neutrality
in terms of standing firm against government intrusion,89 the
imposition of a remedy in search of a problem,90 and the need to
remedy free ridership of ISP networks by content providers.91
Outside the headlines and congressional committee hearing

88

See Network Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
109th Cong. 54–58 (2006), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/
30115.PDF [hereinafter Network Neutrality]; see also Network Neutrality: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Professor Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf [hereinafter Lessig].
89
See, e.g., Hands Off the Internet, http://handsoff.org/blog/ (last visited Nov. 30,
2007). “Hands Off The Internet is a nationwide coalition of Internet users united together
in the belief that the Net’s phenomenal growth over the past decade will continue if
government does not attempt an unwise effort to regulate a market that is otherwise
working to give consumers the choices, freedom, prices and diverse experiences they
desire in the new age of the Internet.” Hands Off the Internet,
http://handsoff.org/hoti_docs/aboutus/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
90
See Arpan Sura, The Problem With Network Neutrality, FREEDOMWORKS, May 2,
2006,
http://www.freedomworks.org/informed/issues_template.php?issue_id=2571
(“Currently there are no principles of network neutrality encoded into law. So ISPs are
already free to block or favor content as they please. It’s telling that none of them has.
In fact, no proponent of network neutrality can cite an existing problem to which network
neutrality is a solution.”). But see Save the Internet: Big Lie 3,
http://www.savetheinternet.com/=lie3 (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (“The constant refrain
of the Astroturf groups like McCurry’s ‘Hands Off the Internet’ is that Network
Neutrality is a solution in search of a problem. They cite the absence of numerous
examples of blocking or degradation to back this argument. This is a red herring. There
are multiple real-world instances of blocking and impairment.”).
91
See Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google’s ‘Free Lunch,’
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020601624.html (“The network builders are
spending a fortune constructing and maintaining the networks that Google intends to ride
on with nothing but cheap servers. . .”).
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rooms92 these carriers object to network neutrality on two more
practical concerns: 1) it would foreclose pricing and QOS
initiatives, made possibly through new techniques including deep
packet inspection, that can generate new revenues and profits; and
2) it would resurrect some of the regulatory constraints and content
scrutiny obligations the carriers thought they had avoided once and
for all having qualified for both copyright and information service
provider safe harbors.
A. Network Neutrality as a Constraint on Price Discrimination
Network neutrality, whether imposed by law or public interest
based FCC regulation, can impose direct restrictions on ISP pricing
and diversification of services based on such factors as reliability,
allocated bandwidth, performance during network congestion,
ability to handle spikes in demand, and quality of service. Not all
network neutrality advocates object to “customer tiering”93 that
constitutes price and QOS discrimination on the end user, demand
side. ISPs already offer end users different subscription rates
based of bandwidth and bitrates. Additional differentiation could
involve variable service quality, based on the ability to handle peak
demand bursts as occurs in peer-to-peer networking, video gaming,
delivery of large files, and real time streaming of video
programming. Deep packet inspection would make it possible for
ISPs to identify priority traffic and to provide superior and
preferential processing for a premium price.
Similarly the concept of network neutrality does not foreclose
attempts by incumbent carriers to reshape access pricing into a
conventional two-sided market94 where ISPs would demand and
92

See, e.g., Network Neutrality, supra note 88; The Communications Opportunity,
Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm.
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006), available
at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/3aug20061330/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house/pdf/109hrg/28317.pdf.
93
See Network Neutrality, supra note 88, at 54–58; see also Lessig, supra note 88.
94
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report 2
(Institut d’Économie Industrielle [IDEI], Univ. of Toulouse, Working Paper No. 275,
Mar. 12, 2004), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/rochet_tirole.pdf
(“Two-sided (or more generally multi-sided) markets are roughly defined as markets in
which one or several platforms enable interactions between end-users, and try to get the
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receive payments downstream and upstream regardless of whether
they serve end users. Under the current pricing arrangement a two
sided market already exists for ISPs that can collect an Internet
access subscription from end users for DSL and cable modem
access to the Internet cloud95 and also charge fees for providing
small ISPs access to major portions of the Internet population these
small ISPs cannot reach via their own networks.
Former AT&T Chairman Ed Whitacre has objected to the one
sided market scenario where AT&T receives subscription
payments from end users, but no additional payments from content
generators who “use” AT&T networks without making direct
payments to AT&T.96 However, nothing about network neutrality
forecloses AT&T from erecting a service so attractive to Google
and other heavy users of the Internet as to entice them to opt for a
contractual agreement providing for premium carriage of their
traffic in lieu of the shared routes made available through the
peering97 and transit98arrangements secured by the ISPs directly
two (or multiple) sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side. That is, platforms
court each side while attempting to make, or at least not lose, money overall.”).
95
Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network
Neutrality Debate, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 461, 474 & n. 47, available at http://ijoc.org/
ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/160/86 (“The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of
interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provides users with seamless
connectivity to these networks and the content available via these networks.”); see also
Alex Barnett Blog, So What Do We Mean by the ‘Internet Cloud’?,
http://alexbarnett.net/blog/archive/2007/04/04/what-is-the-internet-cloud_3F00_.aspx
(Apr. 4, 2007, 23:30 EDT).
96
At SBC, It’s All About “Scale and Scope”, BUS. WK., Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/@@n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/magazine/content/05_45/b395
8092.htm (“Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let
them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So
there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay
for the portion they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? The Internet
can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies have made an investment
and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free
is nuts!”).
97
Internet peering refers to a reciprocal traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP
agrees to accept traffic for onward routing in exchange for a similar routing commitment
by another ISP. Peering typically involves no settlement or payment of funds as ISPs
agree to peer only if they generate and receive roughly the same volume of traffic.
William B. Norton, Internet Service Providers and Peering, Draft 2.5, 2–3 (undated)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~akella/CS740/S07/740Papers/Nor00.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
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serving these heavy users. For example, Akamai99 and other
network management firms offer clients enhanced Internet traffic
routing and content delivery by offloading traffic from best efforts
routing options and onto better-than-best efforts options. Traffic
can reach consumers with greater likelihood for on time delivery
and reliability when ISPs and other Internet companies directly
manage particular traffic streams with an eye toward reducing the
number of routers the traffic has to traverse, avoiding circuitous
routing and inserting traffic on the most reliable and least
congested networks.
Many universities, along with corporations, government
research agencies, and not-for-profit networking organizations,
have agreed to achieve this type of outcome by underwriting
superior routing through the Internet2 network,100 a series of
broadband links not regularly available to non-investors. Internet2
has links to and from the plain vanilla Internet, but investors have
enhanced the likelihood of reliable and qualitative superior routing
by creating a direct or near direct links among investing
organizations. The corporate equivalent to this better-than-best
efforts complete link from content source to consumer are virtual
private networks and Intranets that carve out a small portion of the
overall infrastructure used to provide Internet telecommunications.
Nothing would foreclose AT&T and other ISPs from
engineering a superior and complete Internet routing arrangement
using the carrier’s own facilities, or those of other carriers with
which AT&T negotiated a special traffic management and routing

98

Internet transiting refers to a traffic routing arrangement whereby one ISP agrees to
accept traffic for onward routing for compensation. Transiting involves a settlement and
payment of funds because one ISP requires access to the links, subscribers and content
available via another ISP’s network and its peering arrangements. “Transit is the
business relationship whereby one ISP provides (usually sells) access to all destinations
in its routing table.” Id. at 1.
99
“Akamai uses . . . [network] intelligence to optimize routes and replicate data
dynamically to deliver content and applications more quickly, reliably, and securely.”
Akamai Edge Platform: Application Acceleration that Delivers Content and Applicatons
Quickly,
Reliably,
and
Securely,
http://www.akamai.com/html/technology/
edgeplatform.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
100
See The Internet2 Network, http://www.internet2.edu/network/ (last visited Nov. 11,
2007).
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agreement.101 Network neutrality only would foreclose AT&T
from punishing Internet users who have declined the managed
service option with “less-than-best efforts routing,” that is,
deliberately dropping packets, creating artificial network
congestion, violating Service Level Agreements102 and otherwise
deteriorating the quality of service provided by network links that
AT&T has agreed to make available to other peers and transit
customers, including the ISPs directly serving heavy volume
content providers such as Google.
B. Does Network Neutrality Impose Common Carrier
Responsibilities on ISPs?
ISPs make a valid point that elements of network neutrality
would impose elements of common carrier regulatory burdens that
they have managed to avoid while still qualifying for the DMCA
safe harbors. Having avoided compulsory nondiscrimination
requirements, ISPs now want to use deep packet inspection and
other techniques to engage in selective price and QOS
discrimination while at the same time retaining the ISP status that
eliminates most regulatory scrutiny.
While common carrier regulation imposes some degree of
constraints that would not otherwise exist, one should examine
closely the nature of common carrier-type restrictions that network
neutrality would impose. Not all common carriers face the same
level of constraints, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996
provides a method for selective elimination of common carrier
burdens when the public interest supports such a reduction.103
Technically cellular telephone companies still operate under some

101

See Craig McTaggart, Was The Internet Ever Neutral?, (revised Sept. 30, 2006)
(unpublished paper, prepared for the 34th Research Conference on Communication,
Information and Internet Policy, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington,
Virginia),
available
at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/593/mctaggarttprc06rev.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
102
Service Level Agreements specify network performance commitments typically
between ISPs and their customers.
103
Communications Act of 1934, § 10(c) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1996)).
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of the constraints of common carrier regulation,104 but one could
hardly say such regulation imposes any significant constraint on
pricing and operational flexibility including the ability to operate
clearly non-neutral networks in terms of content access and
limitations on the flexible use of wireless telephone handsets.
Indeed cellular carriers have avoided most common carrier
restrictions including limitations on erecting “walled garden,”
preferred access to video and Internet-based content accessible on
the screens of handsets used by subscribers.105
In other proceedings the FCC has shown that it can and will
impose quasi-common carrier responsibilities on non common
carriers if the public interest warrants, or Congress requires it. The
FCC has required non common carrier, cable and satellite
television companies to carry broadcast television signals as a form
of economic and public interest regulation designed to safeguard
the continuing viability of broadcast television stations.106
Recently the FCC has required, non common carrier VoIP service
providers to contribute to universal service funding,107 to support
enhanced 911 emergency access108 and to cooperate with law

104

In re Pers. Commc’ns Indus. Assoc.’s Broadband Pers. Commc’ns Servs. Alliance’s
Petition for Forbearance For Broadband Pers. Commc’ns Servs., 13 F.C.C.R. 16857
(1998); In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Commc’ns Act, Regulatory
Treatment of Mobile Servs., 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1478 (1994); Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415,
419 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that although the Commission found that the
competitiveness of the commercial mobile radio service market justified exempting such
carriers from the tariff requirements of § 203 of the Act, the Commission had nonetheless
declined to exempt them from §§ 201 or 202).
105
See Rob Frieden, Wireless Carterfone—A Long Overdue Policy Promoting Consumer
Choice and Competition, New America Foundation, Wireless Future Program, Working
Paper No. 20 (Jan. 2008); available at: http://www.newamerica.net/files/Wireless_
Carterfone_Frieden.pdf.
106
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 325, 338–40, 534–35, 543, 548 (1999); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520
U.S. 180 (1997); 47 C.F.R. § 76.55–62 (2006) (cable must carry); 47 C.F.R. § 76.64
(2006) (cable retransmission consent); 47 C.F.R. § 76.66 (2006) (DBS signal carriage).
107
Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518 (2006).
108
IP-Enabled Servs., 20 F.C.C.R. 10245 (2005). The FCC declined to determine the
statutory classification of interconnected VoIP services, but asserted ancillary jurisdiction
under Title I of the Act to require interconnected VoIP service providers to supply 911
emergency calling capabilities to their customers. Id.
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enforcement officials109 in much the same way as common carrier
regulated telephone companies.
C. Are Network Neutrality Requirements Confiscatory and a
Taking of Property?
Opponents to network neutrality also imply that network
neutrality requirements constitute a “confiscatory” and unlawful
“taking” of their property.110 Having invested in next generation
infrastructure at significant expense, both incumbent telephone and
cable television operators expect to have nearly complete freedom
from telecommunications service regulation. However next
generation networks will offer an integrated blend of services,
including the functional equivalents of traditionally regulated,
legacy voice telephony and cable television.
The incumbent carriers appear ready to make two key
arguments that equate regulation going forward as confiscatory: 1)
robust facilities-based competition obviates the need for regulation,
including common carrier aspects of network neutrality; and 2)
commingling and integrating services that use telecommunications
for bitstream transmission convert all retail offerings into
information services. The incumbents have convinced many
legislators and regulators that network neutrality requirements do
not make sense in a competitive environment where the Internet
serves as a single medium for convergent information,
communications and entertainment services.

109

Commc’ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access & Servs., 20
F.C.C.R. 14989 (2005).
110
While reviewing courts have questioned the nature, type and rates of the FCC
mandated common carrier interconnection and facilities-leasing requirements, the
judiciary has not deemed the requirements confiscatory. “The incumbent carriers here
are just like the electric utilities in Duquene in failing to present any evidence that the
decision to adopt TELRIC [i.e., compulsory pricing of local exchange service elements
on the basis of quite low Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost] was arbitrary,
opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory purpose. What we do know is very much
to the contrary.” Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 527–28 (2002); FCC v.
Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987) (holding that the rate set by the FCC was not
confiscatory and thus did not amount to an unconstitutional taking).

FRIEDEN_022508_FINAL

2008]

2/25/2008 7:19:18 PM

INTERNET PACKET SNIFFING

667

D. The Information Service Classification Safe Harbor
Major ISPs also have led a successful campaign to qualify as
information services their broadband first and last mile links to the
Internet cloud, viz. DSL and cable modem access.
This
classification qualifies ISPs for an exemption from any common
carrier, telecommunications service regulation. Having classified
Internet access as an information service, the FCC will have to
resort to clever and probably unsustainable semantic maneuvering
to classify as a telecommunications service any software
application, riding on top111 of the information service classified
bitstream transmission functionality.112 If this scenario plays out
111

The FCC uses telecommunications service and information service definitions to
establish regulatory classifications, without considering the several layers of functionality
involved. For example companies supplying software, which can be installed for use
when initiating an Internet session, properly avoid FCC regulation. Likewise the FCC
can avoid having to regulate the protocols and standards establishing standard operating
procedures for switching, routing and managing Internet traffic. See, e.g., Net Neutrality:
Before the S. Comm. On Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc.),
available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf. “The Internet’s open,
neutral architecture has proven to be an enormous engine for market innovation,
economic growth, social discourse, and the free flow of ideas. The remarkable success of
the Internet can be traced to a few simple network principles—end-to-end design, layered
architecture, and open standards—which together give consumers choice and control
over their online activities.” Id.
112
While the FCC also exempts bitstream transmitting carriers from regulation, in light
of the information service classification, the Commission could opt to examine separately
the different layers combined to support the delivery of a service, such as VoIP. For
background on a revised regulatory regime that applies different degrees of government
oversight based on the scope of competition in each layer of service that blends
telecommunications packet delivery with intelligent networking, software applications
and content, see Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM.
L.J. 561 (2000); Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications
Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003); Frieden, Adjusting
the Horizontal and Vertical, supra note 2; Craig McTaggert, A Layered Approach to
Internet Legal Analysis, 48 MCGILL L.J. 571 (2002); John T. Nakahata, Regulating
Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Communications Regulation From
the Bottom Up, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95 (2002); Philip J. Weiser, Law and
Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2002); Kevin Werbach, A
Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37 (2002); Richard
S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New Communications Public
Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004);
J. Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the United States of the European Union’s
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the FCC would have to extend its information service classification
to other services made available to end users on a retail basis via
information service classified DSL and cable modem links,
including VoIP and video services delivered via the Internet,
commonly referred to as Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”).
These services compete with and constitute the functional
equivalent of legacy services heretofore subject to common
carriage telecommunications service regulation for voice telephony
and cable television regulation. If the information service
classification extends vertically up to software applications, then
the FCC will have created a deregulated safe harbor for just about
any service or software application carried via DSL and cable
modem links, regardless of its functional equivalency with legacy,
regulated services.
The FCC has already begun to realize the quandary it has
created for itself by fashioning such an elastic and expanding safe
harbor. Now bereft of Title II jurisdiction over Internet access and
Internet-mediated services, the Commission has resorted to Title I
of the Communications Act, as amended, to retain an “ancillary”
regulatory hook if and when necessary. The Commission already
has applied this exception to the information service regulatory
safe harbor by requiring VoIP service providers to contribute to
universal telephone service funding, to make available emergency
911 access available and to cooperate with law enforcement
officials. The Commission has rationalized its imposition of quasicommon carrier, telecommunications service regulation by
invoking broad notions of the public interest, by making a
distinction
between
how
different
laws
define
113
and by making a questionable
telecommunications,
Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications, Federal
Communications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper Series No. 36
(July 2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2007); Douglas C. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model for Telecommunications
Policy (2002) (unpublished paper available at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/
95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf).
113
Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1001(8)(B)(ii)
(1994) defines a “telecommunications carrier” as “a person or entity engaged in
providing wire or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the
extent that the Commission finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial
portion of the local telephone exchange service and that it is in the public interest to deem
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differentiation between the use of telecommunications to transport
bits corresponding to an information service and the use of
telecommunications to transport bits corresponding to retail
telecommunications services.114
The FCC may yet again face close judicial scrutiny and
reversal for creating a regulatory safe harbor only to chip away at
it. First, the Commission may have unlawfully stretched its
general public interest mandate under Title I of the
Communications Act. American Library Ass’n. v. FCC already
evidences a court’s unwillingness to endorse the FCC’s unilateral
expansion of its regulatory mission absent express Congressional
authority. Second, the Commission may not persuade reviewing
courts that ancillary jurisdiction, under Title I, as opposed to
conventional telecommunications service jurisdiction, under Title
II, should apply to Internet services, such as VoIP, particularly in
light of the Commission’s selective imposition of telephone
company regulations on VoIP service providers. Third, the
Commission’s telecommunications versus telecommunications
service distinction, may not pass muster with reviewing courts in
light of the fact that telecommunications bitstream delivery occurs
in the very same way for both telecommunications services and
information services.115
The information service provider classification serves the
FCC’s interest in safeguarding the Internet from conventional
telecommunications service regulation, despite several instances
such a person or entity to be a telecommunications carrier for purposes of this
subchapter.” The FCC has interpreted this section as requiring the Commission “to deem
certain service providers to be telecommunications carriers for CALEA purposes even
when those providers are not telecommunications carriers under the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended.” In re Commc’ns Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and
Broadband Access and Servs., 20 F.C.C.R. 14989, 14991 (2005).
114
See generally Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have
in Common? Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence,
32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247 (2006) [hereinafter Frieden, Pizza Delivery].
115
In Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003
(2005) the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s regulatory distinction between
telecommunications and telecommunications services primarily on procedural grounds
that favor judicial deference to expert regulatory agency decision making articulated by
the Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). See also Frieden, Pizza Delivery, supra note 114, at 258.
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where the FCC had selectively re-regulated some information
services. However the FCC’s emphasis on non-regulation results
from its conclusion that ISPs do not operate and should not have to
operate as common carriers, i.e., that ISPs need not operate as
neutral conduits. ISPs can violate any principle of network
neutrality and arguably still retain their largely unregulated status.
On the other hand the DMCA, while not mandating common
carriage, does require ISPs to operate in a manner that evidences
no involvement with the content they carry. Accordingly when
such traffic management occurs, an ISP may not have crossed the
line into regulated telecommunications services, but it still may
lose its copyright safe harbor exemption.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT?
Common carriers operate as neutral conduits and typically
carry content created by others. Conversely, ISPs can offer
varying degrees of neutrality and can readily combine conduit with
content the ISP creates and that created by others.
For
telecommunications common carriers actual knowledge about
criminal and harmful content cannot exist, because the carrier
never examines content absent an external directive such as a court
order. For ISPs actual knowledge can occur when an ISP engages
in deep packet inspection. However the ISP might claim that deep
packet inspection provides only information sufficient for the ISP
to know how to classify, switch, route and process traffic without
actual knowledge of whether by transporting a particular bitsream
the ISP has facilitated copyright infringement.
Answers to the questions whether, how, and when an ISP
acquires actual knowledge of copyright infringement largely
depend on what can and will become standard information
contained in Internet packet headers. Arguably ISPs can limit their
deep packet inspection to that minimally intrusive level needed to
monitor traffic for purposes of “proper” and “routine”
classification, switching, routing and processing. Under this
scenario an ISP might ignore copyright information, i.e., take no
affirmative steps to protect the copyright holder, and simply carry
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packets containing headers that have copyright usage information
that may impact how receivers of a file can use, copy, and resend
the file.
Some types of DRM can provide enhanced copyright
protection without any affirmative efforts by the ISP providing the
link between sender and recipient. If this type of DRM becomes
an industry standard, then ISPs possibly could transmit without any
meddling, scrutinizing or processing, packets containing DRM
instructions for processing by equipment on user premises.
Simultaneously the ISP could use deep packet inspection to act on
other information contained in the header to effectuate non-neutral
networking.
A. Do ISPs Have an Affirmative Duty to Process DRM
Restrictions on Use and Copying?
The possibility exists that standard DRM techniques may
evolve to a point where they require some degree of intervention
by the ISPs in advance of, or in lieu of processing by end user
equipment. Contrary to passively transmitting DRM instructions
and other types of safeguards, ISPs under this scenario would have
to apply deep packet inspection, or some other form of header
examination method, to make DRM processing successful. Such
active examination of traffic raises both intellectual property rights
and privacy questions. While an ISP may have a right to control
copyright infringing behavior, does this control justify packet
inspection to effectuate such a right? Likewise does deep packet
inspection, or other forms of header examination, confer on ISPs
the ability to prevent and otherwise control copyright
infringement?
Bear in mind that ISPs heretofore have
demonstrated the right and ability to remedy copyright
infringement only after the fact and in response to copyright
holders that have performed the necessary forensic examination to
determine who has infringed.116 Deep packet inspection might

116

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(ii–iv) (1999) of the DMCA establishes burdens on copyright
holders to identify copyright infringers before an ISP has any affirmative obligation to
take down infringing content. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (holding that even though the eBay web site offered sale of pirated video
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provide the ability to provide some degree of contemporaneous
DRM, quite possibly on an automated basis once the ISP detects or
has received notification by copyright holders of infringing
activity.
The DMCA does not require ISPs to monitor their networks, or
seek facts indicating the existence of infringement to qualify for
the copyright safe harbors. On the other hand the DMCA also
requires ISPs not to interfere with any “standard technical
measures”117 used to identify and protect copyrighted works. It
appears that ISPs may not block or fail to transmit copy protection
and other DRM safeguards that become effective once transmitted
to end users’ computers. However, the DMCA does not appear to
require ISPs to deploy deep packet inspection, or to retrofit any
sort of packet examination they employ to add DRM enforcement
and copyright infringement detection capabilities.
The absence of an affirmative obligation to enforce DRM may
not extend to a scenario where ISPs readily can use deep packet
inspection to perform traffic and QOS tiering as well as copy
protection as standard operating procedure. Arguably ISPs satisfy
the right to control copyright infringement when they reserve the
option of inspecting the traffic of subscribers as well as transit and
peering traffic generated by other ISPs. ISPs might also have the
ability to control such activity in light of the promising array of
DRM, traffic management, and service diversification options
offered by next generation Internet routers.
IV. NON-NEUTRAL NETWORKS AND THEIR ADVERSE IMPACT ON
FAIR USE
An ISP deciding to operate a non-neutral network, willingly
installs hardware and software that automatically makes binding
decisions about how the ISP will manage specific bitstreams. This
traffic management function can include decisions whether to
block or complete delivery of packets to an intended recipient.

content, the plaintiff’s written notifications did not comply with all DMCA
requirements).
117
17 USC § 512(i)(1)(B).
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When network management includes decisions about the use,
copying, and sharing of content hardware and software substitute
for people and impose new ex ante limitations instead of after the
use examination whether infringement has occurred. Using
technological intermediaries in lieu of human decision makers
risks expanding DRM to a point where hardware and software
operate as proxy censors118 as well as repressors of fair use.119
Fair use in an offline environment involves empirical and value
judgments based on somewhat ambiguous criteria: “The copyright
law, although carefully worded, simply cannot be expressed in the
kind of algorithmic language that is required of computer programs
to automate functionality like printing or copying. This is
especially true of ‘fair use’ . . . a deliberately vague exception to
the monopoly rights of the copyright holder.”120
Empowering hardware and software to establish and enforce a
priori fair use policies usurps decision making by individuals and
vests it with an intermediary that has every incentive to take the
path of least resistance and lowest cost: “[I]f it is costly to
distinguish protected from unprotected speech, the proxy censor is
likely to abandon the effort to avoid errors and adopt a conscious
policy of prophylactic self-censorship that blocks any content that
could precipitate the threat of sanctions.”121

118

“To the extent that potential regulators can induce [providers of Internet equipment
and services] to disrupt communications, whether by blocking payment to targeted
websites, or by embedding obstacles to communication and mechanisms of surveillance
in the hardware or software that facilitates communication, they can spawn effective
proxy censors.” Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 17 (2006).
119
DRM technologies create “a burden of obtaining consent that has no parallel in the
offline world. . . . [E]very permissions-based DRM implementation (in which the user
must formally acquire some form of explicit authorization to engage in a particular use of
the protected work) simply reproduces a variant of the ‘judge on a chip’ problem. No
such system can ever replicate the experience of fair use in the offline world because the
requirement of ex ante authorization by the copyright holder or its designee is a departure
from offline practice and statutory requirements.” Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights
Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 54 (2006).
120
Id. at 52.
121
Kreimer, supra note 118, at 28.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the new profit centers available to non-neutral
Internet networks, most ISPs soon will acquire and install routers
with deep packet inspection capabilities. Having made the
decision to abandon network neutrality, ISPs may have to calibrate
their networks with greater precision to block copyright infringing
traffic. Arguably the DMCA provides a safe harbor exemption
from liability only when the ISP’s costs associated with traffic
scrutiny and management exceed the social benefits accruing from
reduced piracy.
Given the risk of losing a safe harbor, ISPs likely will err on
the side of accommodating DRM cooperation requests from
copyright holders. ISPs probably will collaborate with copyright
holders perhaps going so far as to program hardware with deep
packet inspection software that achieve both traffic management
goals, to pursue price and QOS diversification, as well as DRM, to
mollify copyright holders. Should this scenario play out the
current network neutrality debate will have addressed not only the
future accessibility of the Internet to users and content providers,
but also the future nature and scope of consumers’ fair use
opportunities to access, copy, and resend content available via the
Internet.
Some network neutrality opponents reject the likelihood that a
non-neutral network will occur,122 while others claim that the
Internet never was neutral in the first place.123 Opponents to
network neutrality do not appear to have considered whether and
how hardware and software primarily installed to provide tiered
and differentiated bit transport services, also will have an impact
on consumers’ access to content.124 A non-neutral World Wide
Web will have substantial and direct impact on both the conduit
122

See, e.g., NETCompetition.org, http://www.netcompetition.org (last visited Nov. 28,
2007).
123
See, e.g., supra note 90.
124
See Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253
(2006) (noting the ability of software and software authors to serve as powerful
intermediaries capable of achieving greater regulation and control of endpoint platforms
such as personal computers); see also Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44
B.C. L. REV. 653, 669–70 (2003).
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portion of the Internet and the content traveling via the conduit.
When an ISP chooses to operate a non-neutral conduit, the ISP,
internationally or not, should incur greater responsibility for the
content it carries.125

125

See David V. Richards, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case for
Changing the Legal Regime Created by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1336–37 (2007); Karen Alexander Horowitz, When is § 230 Immunity
Lost?: The Transformation from Website Owner to Information Content Provider, 3
SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 14, 14 (2007); Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding
Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 257 (2006);
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV.
335, 373–74 (2005).

